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The main goal of the paper is to reanalyze the results of previous studies 
on the repeated question effect in the conservation task, and to create a more 
direct test of the repeated question (RQ) hypothesis (repeating of question in 
the conservation task may mislead concrete-operational children to give the 
wrong answer since they interpret the repeating as an implicit sign that their 
first answer is wrong). Reanalysis of previous studies shows that some original 
conclusions need to be modified, and that a more direct test of the RQ 
hypothesis is needed. Each participant (N=58, mean age 7;10) was tested by 
two tasks (conservation of liquid), a standard and modified version. In the 
modified task, liquid was poured into the same glass, so that the child’s answer 
was not under influence of his or her level of cognitive development, but only 
by the repeated question (child who was misled by the RQ would give a wrong 
answer). According to the RQ hypothesis, children who change their answer 
on the modified task also need to change their answer on the standard task. 
Moreover, children who resist the RQ on the standard task do not need to 
change their answer on the modified task. Results show a different pattern than 
expected by the RQ hypothesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
According to Piaget the conservation task is a reliable indicator of cognitive 
functioning (Piaget & Sezminska, 1941; Piaget & Inhelder, 1959; Piaget, 1995). If 
the child solves the conservation tasks then (s)he is at the concrete-operational stage 
(CO) of cognitive development, and vice versa. The conservation of liquid quantity 
(figure 1) can be used as an example of the standard procedure for testing 
conservation. Two identical glasses (A and B) containing an equal amount of liquid 
are presented to the child. The experimenter asks whether the two glasses contain 
the same amount of liquid, or if one contains more and the other one less. After the 
child confirms that glasses contain an equal amount of liquid, the liquid from one 
glass is poured (transformation) into a glass (B1) of different dimensions (for 
example, thinner and higher). Then, the child is asked again whether the two glasses 
contain the same amount of liquid, or if one contains more and the other one less. 
The child is also asked to explain his/her answer. According to Piaget, if the child 
claims that the glasses A and B1 contain the same amount of liquid, and explains the 
answer by (a) identity, (b) inversion, or (c) reciprocity, then it can be concluded that 
the child is at the CO stage.  
 
 
Figure 1. The standard conservation task (liquid quantity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The validity of the conservation task has been criticized widely. Bryant & 
Trabassco (1971) implied that children’s failure can be determined by memory 
constraints and not by quality of reasoning, Bruner, Olver & Greenfield (1966) 
showed that perceptual overloading can also be responsible for failure, Porpodas 
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(1987) found that the discussion between the experimenter and the child during the 
transformation phase interferes with children's reasoning, Elbers, Wiegersma, Brand 
& Vroon (1991) pointed out the strategy of giving the answer (children try to avoid 
repetition of the same response), Donaldson (1978) suggested there was influence of 
children's familiarity with the content (material) of the concrete-operation tasks etc. 
There are also several studies concerned with the role of transformation: with the 
transformation done by the experimenter or the child (Greenfield, 1966), performed 
voluntarily by the experimenter or incidentally by "naughty teddy" (McGarrigle & 
Donaldson 1974/1975), or embedding the transformation and the subsequent 
question in some natural ongoing interaction (Light et al., 1979; Miller, 1982). 
Roazzi & Bryant (1997) showed that children had done better when they measured 
the quantities than when they simply made perceptual comparisons. Likewise, the 
demand for justification of the child's answer was questioned implying it might 
underestimate the child's reasoning (e.g. Brainerd, 1973, 1974). In addition, some 
authors challenged the validity of the conservation task by implying that the 
different social factors are in correspondence with children’s performance: the social 
class the child belongs to (e.g. Perret-Clermont, 1980; Doise, Mugny & Perret-
Clermont, 1981; Roazzi & Bryant, 1997), the institutional context the testing is done 
in (e.g. Schubauer-Leoni, Bell, Grossen & Perret-Clermont, 1989; Elbers, 1986), 
social marking (e.g. Doise, Mugny & Perez, 1998), etc. Moreover, studies of the 
microprocess or (co)construction of conservation suggest that cognitive and social 
competencies (social relations, social interaction and communication) are 
interwoven, and at the same time embedded in the specific cultural-social-
institutional context, so it is hard to study them  independently (e.g. Schubauer-
Leoni, Perret-Clermont & Grossen, 1992; Marro Clément, 1999). Although some of 
these findings were not repeated in the following studies (see Miller, 1982; Eames, 
Shorrocks & Tomlinson, 1990), the global impression is that the relationship 
between the conservation task and the quality of reasoning is not at all as simple as 
Piaget’s theory assumed.  
 
 
Conservation or Conversation? 
 
An alternative explanation of children’s performance in the conservation task 
is the conversation between the child and the experimenter. It is suggested (e.g. 
Rommetveit, 1976; Light & Perret-Clermont, 1989; Siegal, 1991) that the children’s 
performance is determined not only by the cognitive factor, but also by conversation 
and communication rules, language comprehension, the child's interpretation of 
experimenter's intentions, the power relation between adults and children etc. The 
conversation factors may influence children to give pre-operational (PO) answers 
although they are at the CO stage of cognitive development.  
To explain this possibility, Siegal (1991) assumes that children have rich 
implicit, but poor explicit CO knowledge. The implicit knowledge is context Aleksandar Baucal and Ivana Stepanović 
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bounded, and its use is dependent on familiarity of context, i.e. the child can solve a 
task in a familiar context. Since the standard conservation task is a strange and 
unfamiliar context for children, they cannot apply their implicit CO knowledge. 
Consequently, the researcher could make a wrong, false negative conclusion about 
the cognitive level of the child, i.e. to classify a CO child as PO one. Thus, instead 
of a conceptual limitation, the children’s incorrect answers may reflect some 
characteristics of testing communication (uncertainty, misinterpretation of meaning 
or purpose of the question,  desire to give attention-seeking answers or simply a 
wish to end the conversation). Therefore, according to Siegal, the conservation task 
is not only a cognitive task, but also a social one.  
 
 
The repeated question as a critical factor of children’s performance 
 
    Several authors (e.g. Rose & Blank, 1974; Samuel & Bryant, 1984; 
Porpodas, 1987; Siegal, 1991) pointed out the fact that the same question is being 
repeated in the standard conservation task. At the beginning of the procedure, the 
experimenter asks the child if there is the same amount of liquid in the two glasses 
or whether one has more or less liquid. After that, the liquid is poured into a 
different glass and the experimenter repeats the same question. The meaning of the 
first question is to define the starting relation regarding the amount of liquid in the 
glasses, and the meaning of the second one is to test again whether the child 
understands that there must be the same amount of liquid in both glasses.  
The repeated question (RQ) may mislead CO children into giving the wrong 
answer. It is widely known that sometimes adults repeat a question when the child 
gives a wrong answer (Mishler, 1972, as cited in Elbers, 1986; Walkerdine, 1982; 
Kaye, 1982). It is an implicit communicative sign that the first answer is wrong, or 
that the child should think again to find a better answer. It happens in school as well 
as in the family context. Since this kind of experience is a part of everyday 
communication with adults, children may see the RQ in the standard conservation 
task as an implicit sign that their first answer was wrong. Therefore, even the child 
who is at the CO stage may be mislead into saying that after the transformation, the 
two glasses do not contain the same amount of liquid. In this case, the wrong answer 
would not be affected by his/her inability to conserve the quantity of liquid, but by 
an interpretation of the meaning of the RQ.  
 
 
Studies of the effect of the repeated question 
 
  Rose & Blank (1974). The first research study of the effect of the RQ on 
children’s performance was done by Rose & Blank. They stressed the fact that "in 
the normal (nonexperimental) course of events, however, one would never pose an Conservation or Conversation: A Test of the Repeated Question Hypothesis 
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identical question twice if a significant change (italics added) had not occurred" 
(1974, p. 499).  
They tested possible effects of the RQ by comparing children’s performance on 
two versions of the conservation of number task: one-question vs. two-question 
version. It was assumed that the repeated question was the only difference between 
these two procedures. Actually, three procedures were used: (1) the standard 
(presentation of two arrays of disks, first question, transformation, second question), 
(2) the one question (presentation of two arrays of disks, transformation, question), 
and (3) the fixed array (presentation of two arrays in an order typical for post-
transformation state, question).  
Comparison between the standard and the one-question procedures was aimed 
at testing the RQ hypothesis, and the comparison between the one-question and the 
fixed array procedures was supposed to test whether children took the 
transformation into consideration. This is important because children being tested 
with the one-question procedure could focus solely on the perceptual configuration 
of two arrays. In this case, children’s performance would not be a sign of 
conservation thinking.  
Three groups of children with 28 first graders each (mean age: 6;3) were tested 
with one of the three procedures. Each child was tested with four tasks: two tasks 
consisted of equal arrays (5 and 5, 6 and 6), and two had unequal arrays (4 and 6, 5 
and 7). It should be noted that the children were not asked for justification of their 
answers.  
Reported results suggested that the one-question procedure was easier than 
both other procedures, and that inequality tasks were easier than equality ones. The 
findings were interpreted as evidence for the hypothesis that the child "interprets the 
request for a second judgment as a signal to change his response" (p. 500).  
  Although the results seem very suggestive, three pieces of methodological 
information are missing, which represents a constraint for the evaluation of this 
study. First, there is no information about the strategy used to divide children into 
three groups. It could be supposed that random distribution was used, but this is not 
reported. Second, at the end of the task the children were asked "whether the two 
rows have the same number of disks", but it is not clear what had been accepted as a 
correct answer, especially in the tasks with unequal arrays: was it enough for the 
child to answer "different" or could the child just point towards the row with more 
disks? In case the answer "different" was sufficient, this would have been at least 
one source of the difference between equality and inequality tasks. Third, it is not 
reported what the pre-transformational arrays were and what kind of transformations 
were used in the standard and the one-question tasks.  
Having these in mind, what can be concluded from the results of the study? 
Could we conclude that the one-question procedure is easier than the standard one 
because of the misleading effect of the RQ? We should note that in 30% of tasks 
with an equal number of disks, the children were not misled with the RQ in the 
standard procedure. This means that being misled would not necessarily happen 
each time. In addition, 42% of children gave a wrong answer on the one-question Aleksandar Baucal and Ivana Stepanović 
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tasks with an equal number of disks. If we accept that this task measures real 
competence of children contrary to the standard procedure (assuming that children 
were randomly ascribed to groups), this means that the same percentage (42%) of 
children tested by the standard procedure did not understand conservation of 
number. Therefore, 30% of children understood conservation of number in such a 
firm way that the RQ did not mislead them, and 42% of children had no 
understanding of the conservation of number. This means there were about 28% of 
children who might have been misled by the RQ. Thus, the RQ can mislead some, 
but it cannot be an explanation for all the children in the study.  
Neilson, Dockrell & McKechnie (1983). The study was aimed at testing the 
results of the study of Rose & Blank (1974). It tested whether the RQ was by itself 
sufficient to mislead children. It also tested the generality of results regarding other 
conservation tasks and age groups.  
The first experiment dealt with the conservation of number and length tasks. 
Children were randomly assigned to three groups (32 children in each, age range: 
5;9 - 6;7, mean: 6;3). The first one was tested with the standard procedure. The 
second group was tested with the following procedure: pre-transformational array, 
question, repetition of the question. The same procedure was used for the third 
group, wich was presented only with the post-transformational array. The second 
and third groups were used to test whether the repetition of the question itself could 
induce children to change their answer. Each child was given four tasks: two 
conservation of number tasks (one with equal number and one with unequal number 
arrays: 4-4, and 5-4 elements) and two conservation of length tasks (one with equal 
length and one with unequal length string). Half of the children in each group were 
asked to justify their answers.  
The results showed that a small number of children in the second and third 
group changed their answers after the  question was repeated: no one changed the 
answer in the conservation of number with equal arrays, and the biggest proportion 
of changed answers was found in the conservation of length with equal lengths - 4 
out of 32 (12.5%). With regard to justification, in the conservation of number task, 
most of the children (70%) used counting (" 'cos there's four there and four there"). 
Children who were tested with the standard task showed a somewhat different 
pattern of data. About half of them (47% in the conservation of number task, and 
56% in the conservation of length task) changed their answer after transformation, 
i.e. gave a PO answer. Children who did not change their answers (i.e. gave a CO 
answer) mostly used counting in the conservation of number task (54% justified by 
the counting, and 31% by the logical criterion), and had the biggest amount of 
logical justifications in the conservation of length task (53% used a logical criterion, 
and 33% used a perceptual argument). Based on the results of the second and third 
groups, the authors concluded that "the repetition of the conservation question per se 
is insufficient to induce a change of judgment in the child" (p. 167).  
However, they were aware of the important differences between procedures 
they used and the standard procedure. The transformation as a key component of the 
conservation task was not present in the second and third tasks. On the one hand, it Conservation or Conversation: A Test of the Repeated Question Hypothesis 
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seems that the RQ without transformation could be the best test of its effect since 
this procedure is the most similar to the prototype of the RQ in the everyday life (for 
example, when the teacher repeats the same question after the child’s answer). In 
this case, the result was contrary to everyday experience. On the other hand, if we 
are interested specifically in the misleading effects of the RQ in the context of the 
standard conservation task the very structure of the task should be maintained. 
Since the structure of the second and third tasks were different from the standard one 
in an important aspect, it is very hard to make a conclusion about the effect of the 
RQ within the standard procedure, based on these results.  
The second experiment tested the generality of the Rose & Blank (1974) 
results. There were five groups of children (each consisted of 32 children). Three 
groups were tested with the same procedures used in Rose & Blank's experiment 
(the standard, the one-question, the fixed array), but instead of the conservation of 
number task, the children were tested with the conservation of liquid and weight 
tasks. The fourth and fifth groups were tested with the conservation of number and 
liquid tasks, but the former was tested with the one-question procedure and was 
given the fixed array procedure later. Similarly to the Experiment 1, the children 
were randomly ascribed to groups, and each child (N=160, age range: 5;9 - 6;8, 
mean: 6;3) was given four tasks (two conservation tasks x equal/unequal amounts). 
The results are shown in table 1. 
 
Table 1. The number of children (out of 64) who solved correctly conservation tasks (Neilson, 
Dockrell & McKechnie, 1983) 
    Procedure  1 tail test 
 Standard 
 
One 
question 
Fixed array  Standard 
vs. 1Q 
1Q  
vs. fixed 
 
 
Conservation 
task  f % f % f %  p  p 
                  
Exp. 2  Number    34
a      
53
 a 
57  89  56  88  .00  .43 
  Length    28
 a     44
 
a 
39  61  16  25  .03 .00 
 Weight  36  56   38  59  35  55  .37 .32 
 Liquid  15  23  24  38  17  27  .03  .09 
                  
Exp. 3  Number  17  27  21  33  24  38  .23 .28 
 Length  12  19  21  33  14  22  .04  .08 
                  
a These data were taken from the Experiment 1 
 
Neilson, Dockrell & McKechnie concluded that the difference between the 
standard and the one-question procedures is significant only in the case of the 
conservation of number tasks, which means that Rose & Blank's findings cannot be 
generalized (they are specific for the conservation of number task). However, this 
conclusion is not correct because they used the two tail test while the one tail test Aleksandar Baucal and Ivana Stepanović 
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would have been appropriate.
3 When these results are reanalyzed a different 
conclusion is drawn (see Table 1, last two columns). The findings concerning the 
difference between the standard and the one-question procedure are repeated in all 
cases except in the conservation of weight task. Contrary to that, the finding 
concerning the difference between the one-question and the fixed array procedure is 
confirmed only in the conservation of length task. Moreover, the analysis of 
justification in the conservation of number task suggests that the children used more 
counting in the one-question (41%) and the fixed array procedure (56%) than in the 
standard procedure (22%). Reanalysis of differences showed that none of these were 
statistically significant.  
In the third experiment, younger children were examined (N=96, age range: 
4;0 - 5;2, mean: 4;7). They were randomly divided into three groups. All children 
were tested with the conservation of number and length task, but each group was 
tested with one of the three procedures used by Rose & Blank (1974): the standard, 
the one-question, and the fixed array. After reanalysis of data, it is shown that the 
one-question procedure was easier than the standard only in the case of the 
conservation of length task. None of the differences between the one-question and 
the fixed array procedures were significant.  
Samuel & Bryant (1984) also tested the generality of the Rose & Blank study 
with children of different ages (5, 6, 7 and 8 years old). Every group was divided 
into 3 subgroups, and each underwent only one of the three procedures: the standard, 
the one question, and the fixed array. Three conservation tasks were used: number, 
weight, and volume. Each child was tested with four items from each of these 
conservation tasks: two with equal and two with unequal quantities (total: 12 tasks). 
The mean errors are presented in table 2. The authors reported results of ANOVA 
showing that all the main effects were statistically significant, but the interaction 
effects were not. The most important finding was the significant main effect of the 
procedure, specifically the one-question procedure with transformation, which was 
significantly easier than the other two procedures. Samuel & Bryant concluded that 
"the consistent superiority of the one-question condition leads inexorably to one 
conclusion. Children who fail the traditional conservation task often do understand 
the principle of invariance and make their mistakes for a quite extraneous reason. 
They produce the wrong answer because the experimenter's repetition of the same 
question about the same material makes them think that they must change their 
answer the second time." (p. 318).  
 
                                                           
3 The hypothesis of Rose & Blank (1974) claims that the one-question procedure is easier than the 
standard one, not that there is a difference between these two procedures.  Conservation or Conversation: A Test of the Repeated Question Hypothesis 
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Table 2. Mean of errors (out of 4) for four age groups, three conservation tasks, and three 
procedures accompanied with one-tail t-tests (Samuel & Bryant, 1984) 
    Procedure  1 tail  t-test 
Standard  One question   Fixed array  Standard 
vs. 1Q 
1Q  
vs. 
fixed 
 
Age 
yr. 
 
Conservation 
task 
M SD M SD M SD  p  p 
              
 Weight  2.76  1.11  2.10 1.44 2.52 0.91  .05 .13 
5 Number  2.52  1.62  2.10  1.54 2.62 1.46  .19  .13 
 Volume  3.24  1.19  3.05  1.29 3.29 0.82  .31  .24 
              
 Weight  1.57  1.25  1.29 1.35 2.14 1.08  .24  .01 
6 Number  1.81  1.47  1.38  1.76 1.48 1.37  .20  .43 
 Volume  2.29  1.70  1.67 1.52 2.76 1.23  .11  .01 
              
 Weight  0.95  1.43  1.00  1.41 1.29 0.98  .46  .23 
7  Number  1.14 1.42 0.38 0.84 1.43 1.62  .02  .01 
 Volume  1.14  1.58  1.00 1.41 2.24 1.15  .38  .00 
              
 Weight  0.67  1.32  0.38 0.84 0.90 0.87  .20  .03 
8  Number  0.43 0.79 0.24 0.61 0.62 0.84  .19  .05 
 Volume  0.57  1.22  0.67 1.32 1.71 1.31  .40  .01 
              
 
However, a closer examination of the data presented in table 2 suggests a 
somewhat different conclusion. The ANOVA test suggests that there is at least one 
statistically significant t-test, but it is necessary to make an additional t-test analysis 
to find out which difference(s) in the mean errors are significant. Following this, a t-
test analysis of mean errors was made
4 (since the hypothesis based on the previous 
research was that the one-question procedure was easier than the standard one, a one 
tail t-test was done). The analysis shows that there are only two statistically 
significant differences between the standard and one- question procedure: the 
conservation of number task for 7 year-olds, and the conservation of weight for 5 
year-olds. On the other hand, there are 7 out of 12 significant differences between 
two versions of one-question procedures. Therefore, it is hard to conclude that the 
research repeated the findings of Rose & Blank study (1974). It is also hard to say 
that the finding is general regarding different age groups and different conservation 
tasks.  
Porpodas (1987) questioned whether the same results found in the Samuel & 
Bryant (1984) study could be repeated with Greece children. The design of the 
experiment was very similar to the one in Samuel & Bryant (1984). There were 
three groups of children (first and second grade of primary school), and each was 
tested with one of the three procedures: the standard, the one-question, and the fixed 
                                                           
4 It should be noted that the additional t-test analysis is made based on the data presented in the 
original article (Samuel & Bryant, 1984), and not with raw data. Aleksandar Baucal and Ivana Stepanović 
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array. Each child was tested with the conservation of number and the conservation 
of volume task (four tasks each: two with equal and two with unequal quantities). 
The results (presented in table 3) show again that no clear conclusion about relative 
difficulties of the standard and one-question procedure can be drawn.  
 
Table 3. Mean of errors (out of 4) for two age groups, two conservation tasks, and three 
procedures accompanied with one-tail t-tests (Porpodas, 1987) 
    Procedure  1 tail  t-test 
Standard  One question  Fixed array  Standard 
vs. 1Q 
1Q  
vs. 
fixed 
 
Age 
yr. 
 
Conservation 
task 
M SD M SD M SD  p  p 
              
6  Number  2.06 1.80 1.19 1.60 2.30 1.55  .02 .00 
Volume 2.68  1.85  2.26  1.93 2.90 1.42  .19  .07 
              
7 Number  1.03  1.49  1.06  1.34 1.03 1.32  .46  .46 
  Volume  1.94 1.94 1.13 1.54 1.74 1.63  .04  .07 
              
 
Miller (1977) also compared one and two-question procedures with respect to 
the conservation of number and the conservation of liquid quantity. In addition, 
children were asked to give a justification of their judgments. The percentage of 
correct judgments for the one-question conservation of number was .47 (with 
justification: .44), and .44 and .34 respectfully for the two-question procedure . In 
the case of the conservation of liquid, the percentages were .34 (with justification: 
.31) for the one-question procedure, and .44 and .38 for the two-question procedure. 
None of the differences were statistically significant. This means that the study did 
not replicate the results of Rose & Blank (1974), while also suggesting  there is no 
difference between with- and without-justification procedures.  
Siegal, Waters & Dinwiddy (1988) research dealt with the conservation of 
number task. Children aged 4, 5, and 6 were tested with both the one-question and 
the standard procedure (the order was balanced). Two arrays of buttons (Figure 2) 
were used; each consisted of 20 buttons of specific color (red or blue).  
 
Figure 2. An illustration of pre-transformational and post-
transformationa arrays used in Siegal, Waters & Dinwiddy (1988) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-transformational array
Post-transformational arrayConservation or Conversation: A Test of the Repeated Question Hypothesis 
 
  267
In the standard procedure, the pre-transformational array was presented to the 
child. The task was to "point at the row which had more buttons".  A button of the 
same color as the pointed array was given to the child to hold in her/his hand. After 
that, the experimenter rearranged the rows as shown in figure 2, and the child was 
asked again to "point at the row which had more buttons". In the pre-transformation 
phase of the one-question procedure, the child was asked to "think about which row 
had more buttons". The child did not give the experimenter her/his answer, but 
would take a button (out of sight of the experimenter) which was the same color as 
the row with more buttons. The result showed that children produced significantly 
more consistent (CO) answers with the one-question (63% vs. 43%). An advantage 
of this study was that the same children were tested with both procedures. 
Unfortunately, results on cross-tabulation of their answers were not reported. This 
would have been significant since an implication of the RQ hypothesis is that no 
child would succeed on standard, and fail on the one-question procedure (see more 
below).   
In order to test whether children interpret the RQ as an implicit sign that the 
previous answer should be changed, another experiment was carried out. Children 
(4, 5, and 6 years old) had been presented video records of puppets tested by the one 
question and standard procedure, and they were then asked to explain why the 
puppet had given a certain answer (external cause, i.e. "just to please the grown up", 
or internal cause, i.e. "the way the puppet really thought was true"), and to indicate 
certainty of  choice ("not sure at all", "half sure", and "very sure"). The results 
showed that 69% PO answers in the standard procedure, and 44% in the one-
question procedure were explained by an external cause. In addition, taking the level 
of certainty into consideration, the explanation of PO answers in the one-question 
procedure was mostly "internal, not at all sure". In the standard procedure, the 
answers  were divided between "external, not at all sure" and "external, half sure". 
On the other hand, CO answers in both procedures were explained mostly by an 
internal cause (between "internal, half sure" and "internal, not sure at all").  
 
 
Conclusion about existing research 
 
As a summary, two points should be stressed.  
First, after close reanalysis of existing results we can conclude that the 
difference between the standard and one-question procedure is not so clear. The 
difference was found in some cases, but not in others. Moreover, in the second 
Porpodas study the standard task was even easier than the one-question task.  
Second, the fact that the one-question procedure is easier is interpreted as 
evidence that children interpret the RQ as a sign that their first claim was wrong. 
Considering the fact that in all studies different groups of children were tested by 
different procedures, it is not possible to draw this conclusion directly from the 
results. In order to test the RQ hypothesis directly, it is necessary to measure the Aleksandar Baucal and Ivana Stepanović 
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sensitivity of children to the RQ as well as to show that sensitive, but not insensitive 
children, change their answer when they are tested by the standard procedure. It calls 
for the task to be a within group, and not a between group variable. 
 
 
A new way to test the RQ hypothesis more directly 
 
The main goal of the study is to test the RQ hypothesis in a more direct way. It 
assumes that children’s behavior on the standard conservation task is determined by 
both cognitive and social factors (the RQ), contrary to Piaget who assumed just the 
cognitive factor. An empirical test of the RQ hypothesis is based on a study of RQ 
influence in the case when the cognitive factor is controlled. 
In order to control the cognitive factor, a modified version of conservation task 
is designed. In the modified version of the conservation task, the liquid (MT) is 
poured into a glass with the same dimensions, contrary to the standard task (ST) 
where the liquid is poured into a glass with different dimensions (see figure 1 and 3). 
In the ST liquid is poured into a glass with different dimensions to create a 
difference between appearance and reality, and thereby cause different answers 
between CO and PO children. In the MT the liquid is poured into a glass with same 
dimensions in order to suspend the difference between appearance and reality. This 
means that both CO and PO children would behave in the same way regardless of 
their cognitive level. In this way, the MT  controls the cognitive factor .  
 
Figure 3. Modified procedure of the conservation task (liquid quantity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
=  A  B  B1 
?  A  B 
A  B1  ? 
I Starting relation   
II Transformation     
III Ending relation   
  
an equal amount of liquid, or   
does one contain more, and   
the other one less? 
Do the two glasses contain   
an equal amount of liquid, or   
 
the other one less? 
Appearance = Reality 
does one contain more, and 
Do the two glasses containConservation or Conversation: A Test of the Repeated Question Hypothesis 
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How are children likely to behave on the MT? If children’s behavior is 
influenced only by the cognitive factor, as Piaget claims, then both CO and PO 
should give the correct answer (PO should give the correct answer because of 
correspondence between appearance and reality). Contrary to Piaget, the RQ 
hypothesis assumes both cognitive and social factors. Since the cognitive factor is 
controlled in the MT, children can change their answer only due to repetition of the 
question. Therefore, children who change their answer on the MT could be classified 
as “sensitive to the RQ”, i.e. children who are misled by the RQ. 
How could the MT help to test the RQ hypothesis directly? First, if the MT 
"measures" children’s sensitivity to the RQ, and if the RQ can mislead children on 
the ST, then there should be no children who change their answer on the MT and 
pass the ST successfully. In other words, the child who would be misled by the RQ 
in the MT should also be misled in the ST,which means that the child has to give a 
wrong answer in the ST (table 4). Second, if the RQ factor influences children’s 
answers on both MT and ST then it would be necessary to get a positive correlation 
between these two tasks.  
 
Table 4. The possible categories of answers on the standard and the MT according to the RQ 
hypothesis 
  Answers on the modified task 
Answers on  
the standard task 
Changes answer (sensitive to 
the RQ) 
Doesn't change answer (not 
sensitive to the RQ) 
Different amount of liquid  possible possible 
Same amount of liquid  not possible  possible 
 
 
METHOD 
 
 
Participants 
 
58 middle class urban children (26 boys, and 32 girls) who attend first grade of 
primary school (age range: 7;1-8;5, M=7;11).  
 
 
Variable 
 
Sensitivity to  repetition of the question estimated by the modified task - two 
levels: (a) sensitive child (child who changed the answer after the transformation), Aleksandar Baucal and Ivana Stepanović 
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and (b) non-sensitive child (child who gave the same answer before and after the 
transformation).  
Level of cognitive development estimated by the ST - two levels: (a) PO child 
(claims that the amount of liquid is different after the transformation), and (b) CO 
child (claims that the amount of liquid is the same after the transformation and gives 
an appropriate explanation). 
 
 
Procedure 
 
Each child is tested individually by both ST and MT. The order of task 
presentation is balanced.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
The results show that 24 (40.4%) children had changed their answer on the 
MT, i.e. they are sensitive to the RQ.
5 The standard task was completed by 57 
children - 36 of them (63.2%) were classified into the PO group, and 21 (36.8%) 
into the CO group (correspondence table is presented in table 5). 
 
Table 5. Crosstabulation of children’s performance on the ST and MT 
 Modified  task   
 
Standard task 
Sensitive on the RQ  Not sensitive on the 
RQ 
 
Total 
      
PO  16 20  36 
 44.4%  55.6%  63.2% 
 69.6%  58.8%   
      
CO  7 14  21 
 33.3%  66.7%  36.8% 
 30.4%  41.2%   
      
Total  23 
40.4% 
34 
59.6% 
57 
 
χ2=0.68, df=1, p=0.41 
 
There is no statistically significant correlation between answers on the ST and 
MT. This means that there is no difference between children who are and who are 
not "sensitive" to the RQ with respect to their performance on the ST (in both groups 
                                                           
5 Half of those (12 children), who changed the answer, said that the glass A contained more liquid 
than the glass B1, and the other half told the opposite. Conservation or Conversation: A Test of the Repeated Question Hypothesis 
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about 37% of children solved the ST). Thus, there were children who gave the 
correct answer on the ST, despite of their sensitivity to the RQ.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The results have shown the following: (a) some children changed their answers 
on the MT, and (b) there were children who changed their answer on the MT and 
solved the ST with no statistically significant correlation between these two tasks. 
The first finding is in accordance with the RQ hypothesis since changing of the 
answer in the MT can be explained only by the repetition of question since the MT 
is designed in such a way so that the child’s answer is independent of the level of 
cognitive development.  
The second finding, however, is not in accordance with the RQ hypothesis. 
First, some children who are sensitive to the RQ succeeded in solving the ST, which 
is not possible according to the RQ hypothesis. Second, the fact that there is no 
correlation between ST and MT suggests that there is no common factor influencing 
the child’s answer on both tasks. This means that if the RQ influences the child’s 
answers on the MT, it does not influence the child’s answers on the ST.  
Why would the RQ influence the child’s answers on the MT only? It seems 
that this finding can be explained by the context in which an adult repeats the 
question. If we consider the ST, we can see that an important change has happened 
between the two questions - the liquid is poured out from one glass into a different 
one, which might make the second question meaningful for children. Rose & Blank 
(1974) said that children expected “one would never ask the identical question twice 
if a significant change (italics added) had not occurred" (p. 499). In the ST, the child 
observes some change in the setting and because of that, the second question might 
not be taken as repetition of the same question. On the other hand, there is no such 
change in the MT, since liquid is poured into the same glass. Therefore, the second 
question can be treated as repetition of the first question, and the repetition might be 
interpreted as an implicit communication sign for children to change their answer. 
According to that, it could be concluded that the RQ hypothesis is confirmed for the 
MT, but not for the ST.  
Taking into consideration the findings based on reanalysis of results of 
previous studies about the RQ showing that these results are vague, it can be 
concluded that the issue of the repeated question and its role in the conservation 
tasks is still open. 
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  Osnovna tema ovog rada je provera hipoteze kojom se tvrdi da ponavljanje 
pitanja u zadacima konzervacije može biti razlog da deca koja su inače dostigla 
konkretno-operacionalni stadijum daju pre-operacionalni odgovor. U zadacima kon-
zervacije deca se prvo suočavaju sa dva objekta koji su jednaki po nekoj dimenziji 
(npr. dve iste čaše koje sadrže istu količinu vode) i treba da odgovore na pitanje da li 
su dva objekta isti po datoj dimenziji ili je jedan veći, odnosno manji (u pomenutom 
primeru: Da li u obe čaše ima isto vode ili u jednoj ima više, a u drugoj manje 
vode?). Kada dete potvrdi da su dva objekta identična u pogledu date dimenzije (u 
pomenutom primeru: količine vode), vrši se transformacija jednog od objekata, ali 
takva transformacija koja ne dovodi do promene transformisanog objekta u pogledu 
date dimenzije (u pomenutom primeru: presuti vodu iz jedne čaše u drugu čašu 
različitih dimenzija ne menja količinu tečnosti). Konačno dete treba da odgovori na 
pitanje koje je identično pitanju koje je postavljeno pre transformacije (Da li u obe 
čaše ima isto vode ili u jednoj ima više, a u drugoj manje vode?). Prema Pijažeu 
zadaci konzervacije su pouzdani indikator konkretno-operacionalnog mišljenja. 
Međutim, različiti autori su smatrali da deca mogu biti zbunjena ponavljanjem istog 
pitanja i da ta okolnost može da dovede do toga da deca koja već imaju sposobnost 
konkretno-operacionalnog mišljenja daju pre-operacionalni odgovor. U osnovi ove 
hipoteze je pretpostavka da su deca stekla naviku u okviru svakodnevne komuni-
kacije da ponavljanje istog pitanja u kontekstu kada se ništa bitno nije promenilo 
predstavlja implicitni znak detetu da treba da promeni svoj prvobitni odgovor. Na 
osnovu ove pretpostavke deca bi razumela ponavljanje pitanja u zadatku konzer-
vacije na isti način i to bi ih navelo da nakon transformacije umesto da izraze 
uverenje da u dve čaše ima ista količina vode (na šta ih navodi konkretno-opera-
cionalno mišljenje) daju odgovor da u dve čaše ima različita količina vode (na šta ih 
navodi komunikacija sa eksperimentatorom, tj. ponavljanje istog pitanja). 
U članku su prikazana dosadašnja istraživanja koja su imala za cilj proveru 
ove hipoteze. Pored toga, rezultati ovih istraživanja su ponovno analizirani što je 
dovelo do delimične revizije zaključaka koji su sami autori izveli na osnovu svojih Conservation or Conversation: A Test of the Repeated Question Hypothesis 
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rezultata. Pregled i ponovna analiza rezultata dosadašnjih istraživanja naveli su nas 
na dva zaključka: (a) na osnovu postojećih nalaza ne može se doneti zaključak o 
tome da li ponavljanje pitanja zaista utiče na odgovore dece na zadacima konzer-
vacije, i (b) u dosadašnjim istraživanjima efekat ponavljanja pitanja u zadacima 
konzervacije je ispitivan na indirekatan način (različite grupe ispitanika rešavale su 
različite verzije zadatka konzervacije) što ne omogućava izvođenje pouzdanih 
zaključaka i da je neophodno da se dizajnira istraživanje u kojem bi se ova hipoteza 
direktnije testirala.  
Direktniji test hipoteze o ponavljanju pitanja omogućen je dizajniranjem 
modifikovane verzije zadatka konzervacije količine tečnosti. Modifikovani zadatak 
konzervacije se razlikovao od standardnog zadatka po tome što je tečnost iz jedne 
čaše presipana u čašu koja je bila identična čašama koje su korišćene pre trans-
formacije. Na taj način i deca sa pre-operacionalnog i sa konkretno-operacionalnog 
stadijuma mogu dati tačan odgovor čime je izvršena kontrola kognitivnog faktora u 
zadatku konzervacije. Dakle, ukoliko bi dete promenilo svoj odgovor na modi-
fikovanom zadatku to bi značilo da je dete osetljivo na ponavljanje pitanja što znači 
da ovaj zadatak ispituje osetljivost ispitanika na ponavljanje pitanja u zadatku 
konzervacije. Pored toga, u istraživanju koje je prikazano u okviru članka, isti ispi-
tanici (58 učenika prvog razreda iz Beograda prosečnog uzrasta 7;11) su rešavali i 
modifikovani zadatak i standardni zadatak konzervacije tečnosti (balansiranim 
redosledom) čime je omogućeno da se ispita da li će deca koja su pokazala oset-
ljivost na ponavljanje pitanja (promenila odgovor na modifikovanom zadatku) isto-
vremeno dala pre-operacionalni odgovor na standardnom zadatku što bi moralo da 
se desi ukoliko je hipoteza o ponavljanju pitanja ispravna. Drugim rečima, impli-
kacija hipoteze o ponavljanju pitanja je da treba da postoji korelacija između stan-
dardne i modifikovane verzije zadatka konzervacije. 
  Rezultati istraživanja nisu u skladu sa implikacijama koje slede iz hipoteze 
o ponavljanju pitanja. Prvo, postojali su ispitanici koji su menjali svoj odgovor na 
modifikovanom zadatku i istovremeno davali konkretno-operacionalni odgovor na 
standardnom zadatku. Drugo, nije postojala korelacija između odgovora dece na mo-
difikovanom i standardnom zadatku konzervacije.  
  Dobijeni rezultati sugerišu da ponavljanje pitanja deluje u modifikovanom 
zadatku, ali ne i u standardnom zadatku konzervacije. Moguće je da u standardnom 
zadatku konzervacije ponavljanje pitanja deca doživljavaju kao smisleno s obzirom 
da se između dva pitanja nešto bitno promenilo u situaciji (tečnost je presuta u čašu 
koja je drugačijeg oblika) i da stoga deca nisu zbunjena ponovljenim pitanjem. Ta-
kođe, s obzirom da se nešto bitno desilo između dva pitanja deca ne doživljavaju 
drugo pitanje kao bezrazložno ponavljanje prvog pitanja pa samim tim ne postoje 
uslovi da deca drugo pitanje doživljavaju kao implicitni znak da je njihov prvobitni 
odgovor bio pogrešan.  
 
Ključne reči: Piaget, kognitivni razvoj, konzervacija, konverzacija, ponovljena 
pitanja 